U.S. Supreme Court affirms Tenth Circuit’s ruling that
Congress’ enactment of section 514 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act was
constitutional though it removes copyrighted work from the public domain
Petitioners are orchestra conductors, musicians, publishers,
and others who formerly enjoyed free access to works in the public domain. They
filed a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of § 514 of the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act in 2001.The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works (Berne Convention or Berne), which took effect in 1886, is the
principal instrument that governs international copyright issues. The United
States joined the Convention in 1989.
In §514 of the 1994 Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA),
Congress gave works enjoying copyright protection abroad the same full term of
protection available to U.S. works. The URAA grants copyright protection to pre‑existing
works of Berne member countries protected in their country of origin, but
previously lacking protection in the United States to improve U.S. protections
in three undesirable situations: [1] that the United States failed to protect
works from the country of origin at the time of publication;[2] that the United
States did not protect sound recordings made before 1972; or [3] that the
foreign author or composer had failed to comply with U.S. statutory
formalities.
The URAA affords no protection to a foreign work after its
copyright term has expired, whether under the laws of the country of origin or
U.S. laws. This causes the work to fall within the public domain. URAA’s § 514
grants authors the protection they would have enjoyed had the United States
maintained copyright relations with the author’s country. Finally, foreign
authors gain no credit to make up for the protection they lacked in years prior
to § 514’s enactment. Congress then tried to include ameliorating
accommodations to foreign authors.
Petitioners sued the United States in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Colorado. The District Court, however, gave summary
judgment to the U.S. The Petitioners appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit, which affirmed in part and remanded with an instruction to
the District Court to address the First Amendment claim. The District Court
then held that Section 514 does not regulate speech on the basis of its
content. The law must be upheld if narrowly tailored to serve a significant
government interest. The District Court concluded that the Petitioners are
entitled to Summary Judgment because §514’s constriction of the public domain
was not justified by any of the asserted federal interests (compliance with Berne
Convention, securing greater protection for U.S. authors abroad, or remediation
of the inequitable treatment suffered by foreign authors whose works lacked
protection in the United States).
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed.
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari and affirms the Tenth
Circuit’s holding.
The Court begins by declaring that §514 does not exceed
Congress’ authority under the Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
Analyzing the text of this Clause, the Court finds that it does not exclude the
extension of copyright protection to works in the public domain. It finds that
the Petitioners are requesting a reading of the clause that is incompatible
with the Court’s previous decisions.
“The difference, Petitioners say, is that the limited time
had already passed for works in the public domain. What was that limited term
for foreign works once excluded from U.S. copyright protection? Exactly zero,
Petitioners respond. We find scant sense in this argument, for surely a
‘limited time’ of exclusivity must begin before it may end. In aligning the
United States with other nations bound by the Berne Convention, and thereby
according equitable treatment to once disfavored foreign authors, Congress can
hardly be charged with a design to move stealthily toward a regime of perpetual
copyrights.” [Slip op. 18‑19].
The history behind the Copyright Clause corroborates this
view. Though the Petitioners argue that Congress has acted contrary to its
customary practice by enacting a statute that removes works from the public
domain, the Court disagrees. The Court points out that Congress has previously
removed works from the public domain before the passage of the URAA.
“Subsequent actions confirm that Congress has not understood the Copyright
Clause to preclude protection for existing works. Several private bills
restored the copyrights of works that previously had been in the public domain.
. . . These bills were unchallenged in court.” [Slip op. 21]
Next, the Court looks to the stated purpose of the Copyright
Clause. It is to promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts by enacting
systems of copyright and patent protection. Petitioners argue that removing
works from the public domain is not within this purpose, as it does not relate
to new works. The Court disagrees,
“In response to this argument, we held that the Copyright
Clause does not demand that each copyright provision, examined discretely,
operate to induce new works. Rather, we explained, the Clause empowers Congress
to determine the intellectual property regimes that, overall, in that body’s
judgment, will serve the ends of the Clause. And those permissible ends, we
held, extended beyond the creation of new works.” [Slip op. 24‑25]
“Considered against this backdrop, §514 falls comfortably
within Congress’ authority under the Copyright Clause. Congress rationally
could have concluded that adherence to Berne promotes the diffusion of
knowledge. A well‑functioning international copyright system would likely
encourage the dissemination of existing and future works. Full compliance with
Berne, Congress had reason to believe, would expand the foreign markets
available to U.S. authors and invigorate protection against piracy of U.S.
works abroad, thereby benefitting copyright‑intensive industries stateside and
inducing greater investment in the creative process.” [Slip op. 26]
“Congress determined that U.S. interests were best served by
our full participation in the dominant system of international copyright
protection. Those interests include ensuring exemplary compliance with our
international obligations, securing greater protection for U.S. authors abroad,
and remedying unequal treatment of foreign authors. The judgment §514 expresses
lies well within the ken of the political branches. It is our obligation, of
course, to determine whether the action Congress took, wise or not, encounters
any constitutional shoal. For the reasons stated, we are satisfied it does not.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit is therefore
[a]ffirmed.” [Slip op. 36]
The Dissenters find that the Copyright Clause did not
authorize Congress to enact the statute. Conducting statutory interpretation,
the dissenters state that its conclusion has long been upheld by case law. “The
fact that, by withdrawing material from the public domain, the statute inhibits
an important preexisting flow of information is sufficient, when combined with
the other features of the statute that I have discussed, to convince me that
the Copyright Clause, interpreted in the light of the First Amendment, does not
authorize Congress to enact this statute.” [Slip op. 69]
Citation: Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873; 181 LE.2d
835 (2012).
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